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A Brandeis Brief is a brief to a court that combines 
evidence, testimony and arguments in relation to a 
matter, together with legal argument. The Brandeis 
Brief is named after Louis D. Brandeis, who was asked 
by Florence Kelley and Josephine Goldmark in 1907 to 
compile statistics from medical and sociological journals 
and list citations to the articles in representing the 
state of Oregon in the case of Muller v. Oregon, 208 US 
412 in the United States Supreme Court, involving the 
constitutionality of limiting hours for female laundry 
workers. This document was of utmost significance in the 
case, and was the first brief submitted to the Supreme 
Court that relied primarily on extra-legal data to prove an 
argument.1 
The Brandeis Brief set out below in full was prepared 
by George L. Paul, who circulated it to all of those listed 
at the end of the Brief for their comments. Mr Paul was 
retained as Co-Counsel in a Writ of Habeas Corpus 
proceeding in California. The client was the subject of 
a covert operation that involved the use of a recording 
device, that had as one of its capabilities the recording 
to a WORM drive. It was the policy of the Sherriffs 
Department that this authenticity protocol be used. 
WORM drives are not perfect, but arguably they are better 
than nothing.
The recording was intentionally made without the use 
of the authenticity protocol, and was instrumental in the 
conviction of a crime. The client’s position is that the 
recording was edited and his lawyers have marshalled 
substantial evidence to that effect. His original lawyer did 
not object to the admission of the recording into evidence. 
The client now wants a new trial, on the basis that his 
lawyer did not protect his rights. The original lawyer did 
nothing relating to the authenticity of recording.
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The amici curiae submitting this brief are experts who 
specialize in the authentication of digital information, 
and who have experience in the evidentiary use of 
digital media in legal proceedings. Our experience and 
qualifications are summarized in the concluding section 
of the brief. We believe that the accompanying brief will 
assist the Court in deciding this matter because there is 
a general lack of recognition in the rules of evidence and 
case law regarding the qualitative difference between 
traditional evidentiary writings that are tangible, three-
dimensional, and free-standing, e.g., an affidavit with 
an original signature and notary seal, vs. digital writings 
that cannot exist outside a host medium such as a 
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computer or electronic data storage unit. This qualitative 
difference has major implications not well-recognized in 
the rules of evidence or case law as to reliable means of 
authenticating digital writings.
Amici curiae therefore apply for permission to file the 
accompanying brief to assist the Court in reaching an 
informed and reliable resolution of the pending issues 
regarding the authentication of the digital recording 
at issue here. In compliance with Rule 8.200(c)(3)(A), 
California Rules of Court, amicus curiae George Paul 
states that petitioner William French Anderson paid 
him fees for coordinating communications among the 
other amici, and for preparing and editing the brief. In 
compliance with Rule 8.200(c)(5), amici curiae state that 
they do not support either party.
AUTHENTICATION OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY
A. The Qualitative Difference Between Digital and 
Physical Evidence.
Traditional writings had a physical and tangible existence, 
subject of course to the deterioration inevitable with the 
passage of time, e.g., ink fades, parchment crumbles, 
etc. However, it was always at least theoretically 
possible to detect extrinsic and intentional changes to 
the original writing. Detection was not guaranteed, and 
forgers have been challenging the integrity of the legal 
system for centuries. The legal system responded with 
rules regarding the authentication of proposed writings, 
and frequently relied on specialists such as questioned 
document examiners to inspect the writing for indicia of 
alteration.
In contrast, digital records do not depend on the 
alteration of physical matter, and therefore the inspection 
of an item of digital data is not a reliable or even a logical 
method for testing authenticity. In an inspection one can 
only view the information in its current state as contained 
in its host medium. The digital record consists of an 
arrangement of a finite number of 1s and 0s,3 and not 
untold molecules bound together in a three-dimensional 
space. In most instances, the medium host in which 
digital writings are offered as evidence is not the original 
host in which the digital writing was created.
One of the most important but least understood things 
about digital writings is that they can be altered without 
any ability to test for change by an inspection of the 
record itself. This is a stark difference from traditional 
physical writings in which traces of change could be 
detected from indicia in the document under inspection. 
Writing can be smeared or smudged, and that smear or 
smudge appears on the record because it is an artifact 
of three-dimensional matter that carries the information. 
A page can be torn out of a document, and be found to 
be missing upon inspection. One can sense a cut-and-
paste job in a photograph. Magnetic clips can be heard in 
taped sound recordings, where the physical medium was 
altered.
In our digital age, software has generally evolved 
to facilitate undetectable or seamless editing of 
informational records. This is one of its main advantages 
in a business or legal context. The advantage of a word 
processor over a typewriter was the ability to easily 
modify the previous text, and yet leave no indication 
of that modification. The old information was lost—on 
purpose—and the new information was saved in an 
information object, often called a “file.”
Information was thus undetectably changed in the 
record as a result of the processing of information. The 
new arrangement of information was saved as the record. 
There was not, however, necessarily a record about a 
critical, second set of information: information about the 
changes that were made. The history of what has been 
changed may or may not have been recorded. The ability 
to record such a history is dependent on the abilities of 
the program and whether that function has been enabled 
by the user. Or, there may be an incomplete record of 
the history of any changes. Or, there may be no record 
of changes. Furthermore, whatever record there is can 
subsequently be destroyed. And in addition, there are 
tools that enable individuals to edit certain records about 
the properties of files, making the process of testing 
authenticity even more difficult.
Nearly every application in use today is designed to 
modify existing content in such a way that a modification 
would not be detectable unless a history of the change 
was being recorded. Thus, this seamless editing function 
is endemic. It occurs with most business software such 
as word-processing applications, e-mail, spreadsheets, 
and graphics programs. But one also has the ability to 
seamlessly edit photos. Even a newbie user of Adobe 
Photoshop can make a dirty glass disappear off the table, 
or change the time on a clock, for example.
Seamless editing can occur in sound records, as well. 
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Words in a recorded conversation can be rearranged 
digitally, without any indication there has been a change. 
Transitions, formerly quite discontinuous, can be 
smoothed out by computer processing in sound editing 
tools. So, too, can digital video be edited, as any viewer of 
modern commercial advertisements can attest.
B. The Authenticity Issues Regarding Digital Evidence.
Almost everything that can be digitized can be modified, 
leaving no indication it has been changed. There may be 
no information in the file about the change. Who changed 
it? When? How was it changed? What was the information 
before it was changed?
Critically, it is most often impossible to answer these 
questions. There is simply not enough information 
available to allow a test for answers. The information 
about the torn-out page in the book of account, the 
smudge that appeared with the pencil, or the presence of 
white-out that appeared with the pen—the information 
about the change—is missing in the digital realm.
Accordingly, profound authenticity issues pervade all 
spheres of modern society, including legal systems.4 Our 
tried-and-true inspection paradigm, which was written 
into the law of evidence long ago, fails us with regard 
to digital records. No matter how carefully one studies 
things, one may only be able to discern the most recent 
version of a digital file, not its makeup seventeen versions 
ago, much less its original composition. There is now a 
panoply of products designed to erase any vestiges of the 
past history of files—to annihilate their metadata, and 
any vestigial changes or comments. Law firms frequently 
use these on, for example, Word® files before they are 
sent outside the law office. This way, opposing firms 
can only know the current information in the file, the 
information of the present, and not discover the thinking 
of their opponents by looking at various other views that 
might be available.
This endemic inability to test digital information about 
previous states—a combination of seamless editing with 
the fact that digital evidence consists of pure information 
objects, not complex three-dimensional artifacts—is 
referred to here as untestability. This characteristic of 
untestability gives rise to the need for countervailing 
authentication requirements to maintain the integrity of 
the legal system. All participants in the system deserve a 
system in which the authenticity of records can be tested. 
Otherwise we are adrift.
C. The Unavailability of An “Original” of a Digital Record.
The venerable best evidence rule appears to provide a 
simple solution to authentication of digital writings, i.e., a 
requirement that the original electronic file be produced. 
Unfortunately, that is virtually unattainable because 
the “original” record cannot exist independently of the 
machinery on which it was created. A lawyer who drafts 
a contract on a word processor, hits “Save”, and names 
the document has created the original. However, that 
pristine original file cannot be maintained in its original 
form unless the computer on which it was saved is taken 
out of service and stored for future evidentiary use. And 
even then, there would need to exist testable evidence 
the digital file was not edited before preservation of 
the device. Similarly, a recording device that captures a 
conversation has the original digital audio data, but that 
data cannot be maintained in its original form without 
taking the recorder out of service and preserving it with 
the digital data for future reference. That procedure is 
manifestly impractical, as the recording device could only 
be used once. Instead, what happens now is the original 
digital data is electronically removed from its initial 
resting place, re-processed through a computer program, 
and presented in a different host medium. At that point, 
there no longer exists a data set that can be identified as 
the original.5 
The printout is an original of what was printed out, 
not necessarily an exact copy of the original digital 
information. Thus, the definition is almost meaningless. 
The drafters of Rule 1001(d) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence gave no thought to the fact that digital files 
are pure information, and live apart from the world of 
artifacts, and that such information can be undetectably 
edited on networks without any ability to test for changes. 
4 George L. Paul, The Authenticity Crisis in 
Real Evidence, first published in Scientific 
Evidence Review, Monograph No. 5, (ABA 
2001), and then subsequently in Law Practice 
Today, 2006, available at http://www.
abanet.org/ lmp/Ipt/articles/tch03065.shtml.
5 The legal system has generally responded 
to this technological reality by relaxing the 
best evidence rule to the point that it is no 
help in resolving authentication issues. The 
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence 
in the early 1970s could not have foreseen 
the technological developments of the 
1980’s and beyond. Indeed, in defining 
“original” in Rule 1001(3), the drafters 
declared that anything that was printed 
off a computer was an original so long as 
the printouts accurately reflect the data 
currently in the computer. F.R. Ev. 1001(d) 
currently reads, “For electronically stored 
information, ‘original’ means any print-
out – or other output readable by sight—if 
it accurately reflects the information”. 
Even if an electronic file had been edited 
numerous times over several years, as long 
as a printout is accurate of what is currently 
stored in the computer’s memory, the 
printout is an “original” for purposes of 
Rule 1001(d). This eviscerates the traditional 
meaning of the term “original”.
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Thus, the concept of “original” under the Federal Rules 
of Evidence and the evidence codes of most jurisdictions6 
has been reduced to triviality regarding digital 
information.
D. Theoretical Solutions to Digital Authentication Issues.
A reliable test for authenticating a digital record requires 
a comparison of the proffered digital record with a 
trustworthy standard. This requires creation of a digital 
equivalent of an “original”: the will carefully sealed in a 
vault, with a record of access, or a notarized deed kept in 
a county recorder’s office. The information object against 
which we compare the questioned object is called the 
reference.
The reference is simply the object we agreed to trust as 
being authentic as compared with any other object. It is 
the object we choose as the standard of comparison when 
we do our act of comparing. Because digital information is 
no longer tied to physical artifacts, we must arrive at our 
notions of reference differently.
Accordingly, the concept of reference now looms 
large in the world of evidence. Indeed, it is the closest 
proxy or surrogate to an “original” in the physical world. 
The reference is the set of pure information, of which 
there might be a billion copies, that has been declared 
by an entity as the authentic information. A reference 
therefore has an identity associated with it; the identity 
that declares it as authoritative, and, as we will see, the 
identity that protects it and defends its immutability. 
These are most often but not always the same identity. A 
reference contains the information that is the reference 
information (the official content), and an implied promise 
the information will not change through time. A reference 
by its very nature contains a promised attribute of 
immutability.
 In the world of physical records of information, there 
was clearly an act of declaring a reference: the signing 
of the original. The immutability of the artifact gave 
protections against change to the information. Such 
immutability “services” were accepted, and not overly 
pondered. The act of declaring, by an actor or participant, 
was clearly what was in mind, and we therefore have the 
important concept of “signature” in the law. Often there 
were notaries involved, and sometimes other physical 
mechanisms, such as wax or other “seals.” In the digital 
world, we must now be self-conscious about declaring 
what will hence forward be used as references in future 
tests of authenticity.
E.  Practical Solutions to Digital Authentication Issues.
Here are four possible solutions to establishing a 
reference for authentication of digital records.
1. Physical protection of the digital data.
First, one could use the old-fashioned way to protect 
references: physically secure them, typically by locking 
them up. One could use a vault to protect a record 
of digital information. One could use a super-secure 
computer system to store reference information. More 
generally, this objective can be achieved by using a 
trusted third party, whose role is to protect a digital 
record. Indeed, there are now services springing up that 
provide this function. This method works to the extent 
that the reference data submitted to the digital safe-
keeper is trustworthy.
2. Widespread dissemination of the digital data.
A second approach takes a diametrically different tack. 
Instead of locking up information to prevent manipulation, 
one could spread the information far and wide, which 
does not prevent change but which might guarantee 
that change could be easily discovered through the act 
of comparison with the widely distributed information. 
One could, for example, publish either the reference 
information or the “hash”7 of a reference in a newspaper 
of wide circulation. This would ensure there were 
numerous physical repositories of the reference or its 
hash existing on a certain date. The chance that such 
newspapers could all be gathered up, reprinted, and 
then substituted, all over the United States without 
their owners’ knowledge, is mathematically almost zero 
percent. One can trust the digital information object 
existed on a certain date if one found widely distributed 
6 Cal. Evidence Code section 255 is virtually 
identical to the Federal Rule – “‘Original’ 
means the writing itself or any counterpart 
intended to have the same effect by a person 
executing or issuing it … If data are stored 
in a computer or similar device, any printout 
or other output readable by sight, shown to 
reflect the data accurately, is an ‘original’”.
7 A “hash” is the result of a one-way 
transformation of a digital file, by means 
of a mathematical algorithm, which results 
in a unique, but much smaller, digital 
file. In a way these can be conceived as a 
“digital fingerprint.” There are several such 
algorithms in use today, and they are the 
subject of repeated tests and discussions. 
Appropriate hash algorithms have several 
attributes. Importantly, they are one-
way, irreversible transformations. With a 
good hash algorithm, it is mathematically 
infinitesimally unlikely for one to deduce 
the content of the original file. Thus, the 
fingerprint is a secret fingerprint to those 
that have been distributed the hash file. 
Among other attributes, hashes are useful 
because the transformed file is extremely 
small. Accordingly, hash algorithms, and 
hashes, are useful in comparing digital files 
to test whether they are perfectly identical. If 
the files differ by only one bit, when hashed, 
the two files will render fundamentally and 
unpredictably different results.
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newspapers with its hash published on that date.
3. Creation of an uneditable first copy as the reference.
The third approach is to require the party who creates 
the digital data to immediately make an un-editable 
digital memorialization of the contents of that file. One 
could store the record in read-only format on media, 
commonly known as “WORM” or “write once, read many” 
format. This is a “preventing change” solution, not a 
“discovering change” solution. Many solutions do exactly 
that. Many believe this is in fact the simplest and most 
straightforward method for an individual or entity that 
seeks to preserve digital records for litigation use. This 
is also the procedure recommended by the manufacturer 
of the recording device used by the Los Angeles County 
Sheriffs in this case. See Exhibit E, Habeas Corpus 
Petition. This procedure is technologically simple, and 
requires no third party involvement. It does require 
that the individual or entity follow a clear protocol that 
minimizes the possibility of alteration.8 
4. Integrity, Identity and Time Attributes As Established 
by Advanced Information Security Techniques.
There are technologies, which involve various types 
of encryption and other algorithms, that have become 
important in the last few years and which address 
concerns involving the authenticity of digital information. 
Indeed, as illustrated in Stephen Mason’s case study, 
“Digital Evidence in Five Nations,” found as Appendix 
D to George L. Paul, Foundations of Digital Evidence 
(ABA publishing 2008), this methodology has been 
incorporated into many of the civil law jurisdictions in 
Europe and elsewhere. Such techniques are used as a 
way to authenticate digital records by testing various 
“attributes” of digital information -- including the identity 
of the creator or “signer” of a file, a continued integrity 
through time (meaning testable knowledge a file has 
not changed in unauthorized or unknowable fashion), 
and even a trusted method of determining the relevant 
time associated with of a reference. Such methods can 
be used, if implemented properly (the details of which 
are beyond the scope of this brief), to confirm who 
declared the reference or who protected it as inviolate; 
and to provide a check of integrity on any purported 
information object that is compared to the reference as 
identical. Just like locking information up in a safe with 
trusted guardians protecting it, this mathematical and 
business process solution can solve the issue about both 
how to protect the reference as immutable and to test 
its “signer,” or the entity that declared it as a reference. 
In some implementations, the “time” of the creation of 
the reference can also be recorded as trusted data, with 
technologies explained in Chapter 5 of Foundations of 
Digital Evidence. Such more advanced, mathematically 
and business method solutions can be used to reveal the 
existence of any unauthorized tampering between the 
time the reference is protected and the time the purported 
digital information is tested against the reference.
CONCLUSION
We urge the Court to consider these aspects of digital 
records in adjudicating the issues presented here, and, for 
the benefit of the bench and bar, promulgate appropriate 
standards for the authentication of digital writings.
DATED:     
Respectfully submitted,
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THOMAS G. STOLPMAN
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8 This method makes the reference immutable, 
but cannot conclusively preclude the creation 
of an altered reference by those in control of 
computer environment variables.
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